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ABSTRACT
Small satellite developers should be encouraged by the fact that reasonably priced access to space is not really the
hurdle that it is often perceived to be. An analysis of the small satellites launched in recent years by their sub-classes
and annual rates of launches demonstrates that small satellites launch opportunities are widely available, and that a
range of methods are utilised including dedicated, shared or piggy-back launch.
Based on experience with a wide range of small satellite launches, it is illustrated how many of the perceived
barriers to launching small satellites can be overcome. In particular with regard to affordable launch cost, which is
commonly considered one of the major hurdles in the small satellite community.
The methods for small satellite launch are considered, and a statistical analysis is performed to show that, at a
macroscopic scale, there are plenty of launch opportunities, and a significant number of small satellites would be
launched with minimum expenditures if an approach to a choice of launch method, launch vehicle type and launch
operator will be done in a correct manner. Certain recommendations for a realisation of this approach, including
proposed empirical criteria are given

INTRODUCTION
In order to operate space borne payloads, significant
support infrastructure is required, and mission design
involved the complex task of balancing risk, budget,
and schedule. Many aspects of missions are still
designed and optimised on a case-by-case basis. A lot
of time and effort can be devoted to the design of the
supporting platform, the control system including the
space and ground segment elements, the software and
tools to operate the mission. Few applications can
justify the expense and timescales required to design or
even just customise their launcher, and mission
designers are generally forced to design their spacecraft
to meet already existing launch methods and
opportunities.
The selection of a suitable ride into orbit remains a
complex issue to deal with. Launchers are not yet
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commodity products, and there are few manufacturers,
there is little choice, and there are regulatory, political
and export issues which need to be solved and
addressed, and further restrict launch options. The
entry-level cost for launch is relatively high, and as a
result launchers are generally only manufactured in
small numbers, sometimes only when required.
In the market for geostationary launch, there is some
stability with 20-25 launches per year, and many launch
manufacturers and service providers design their
launchers to maximise their profits from this market.
This has led to the existence of large powerful
launchers, with 3-5m fairing diameters and with the
ability to carry 4,000-15,000kg into geostationary
transfer orbit. Their price tags are commensurate with a
~US$250m+ satellite programme cost as reliable launch
options do not vary significantly from US$20k per kg
for a fully utilised launch vehicle.
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Figure 1. Annual numbers of small satellites launched during 1970-2008

The major space powers have also developed launchers
to support their civil and military space objectives. A
development in the past decade has also seen some
former missile stock piles being converted into
launchers. These provide some additional choice for
mission designers. Nevertheless, the entry-level cost for
any dedicated launch remains high, and the cost and
selection of a suitable launcher for a specific mission
remains a major factor which impacts the mission
design.
Many applications only become viable given a certain
mission cost in order to and provide commercial,
military or scientific value. Although small satellite
technology has matured, and an increasing number of
meaningful missions can be accomplished in principle
with low-cost small satellites, the cost of a dedicated
launch is frequently prohibitive. As a result, launch
availability and methods have often been raised as a
major issue by the small satellite community in the
design of missions. A notable exception is batch launch
of small satellites as part of a constellation, although the
problem of replenishment with single spacecraft could
still presents the same issue.
The worldwide market for small satellites, defined as
missions weighing less than 500kg here for simplicity,
varies between 20 and 60 satellites per year. There are a
few launch vehicles which would serve as a dedicated
launcher for such missions, with average prices around
US$15 million. Market forces have generally been too
weak or business plans too marginal, for new launchers
to be entered into service in this market segment. One
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notable exception is the entry of the FALCON-1
launcher by Space-X in the US.
It can be observed that a significant number small
satellites fall in the micro-satellites class (10-100kg), or
in the nanosatellite class (<10kg here for simplicity).
This size satellite is often developed by universities,
small private companies and scientific organisations,
who have the necessary funds for the satellite
development and manufacture, but do not have the
means to pay for dedicated launch of their satellites.
An obvious solution for those wanting to launch small
satellites has been to use excess capacity on manifested
launches, or to find ride-share partners with compatible
orbit requirements and schedules. These methods have
been used since the early days of the space era, and has
become a popular means to reduce the cost of launch.
This potentially provides a wide range of opportunities,
but in practice there are few incentives for the launch
provider and mission prime. Sharing launch capacity is
a common practice as well, and leads to a lower costof-entry for a launch slot. Both methods have been used
many times, and they are highly effective where the
demands of the mission are flexible in terms of
schedule and orbit. In the majority of cases though, the
arrangement of launch becomes more complex and can
become a major schedule driver in a programme. Due
to this complexity, it may be impossible to find a
suitable opportunity before commencing the project. It
is very easy to underestimate the amount of effort
required to arrange a launch slot, and deal with the
potential political issues, export licenses, and logistical
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planning. It is not uncommon to find organisations with
spacecraft fully manufactured and tested, awaiting a
suitable launch.
Both SSTL and CST are involved in the arrangement of
small satellite launches, either as a developer /
manufacturer (SSTL), or as a broker (CST). Because of
SSTL’s launch rate of about 2 small spacecraft per year,
the challenge of affordable access to space is vitally
important for both the companies. Each has built up
significant expertise in arranging dedicated, shared, or
piggyback launch opportunities. SSTL has developed
extensive experience with “design to launch”
techniques, in order to maximise the launch
opportunities, and minimise the incurred costs for
associated services. CST also has significant expertise
in launch brokering, dealing with the logistical issues
and the complex politics involved. Both companies
have become increasingly involved in brokering the
excess capacity on launches they get involved in
REVIEW OF THE SMALLSAT LAUNCHER
MARKET
Firstly, it is necessary to assess the world’s market of
small satellites and its dynamics. This would allow the
demand for launch services to be defined for this
market servicing both at the current time and in the near
future.

The total annual numbers of small satellites with
masses less than 500 kg which were launched in the
whole world during the period from 1970 to 2008 are
shown in Figure 1 with their distribution by sub-classes
of mini-satellites (100-500 kg), micro-satellites (10-100
kg) and nano-satellites (less than 10 kg). However, as it
was shown in [1], the statistics for this long period is
not a real picture of dynamics for small satellite
launches: for example, the sharp increase of these
launches in the late nineties was due to the so-called
“small communication satellite boom” when the small
Low-Earth-Orbit satellite constellations of Orbcomm
and Globalstar (Iridium satellite mass was above
500kg) were launched, but without creating a sustained
and regular demand
Figure 2 shows annual numbers of all classes’ satellites
that were launched during the period from 1990 to 2005
which when split into their mass classification, exposes
three trends. Firstly, the annual number of all classes of
satellites being launched is decreasing (especially if one
does not take into account the above-mentioned “boom
of 1997-2000) that is underlined in this Figure.
Secondly, on the background of this decrease, the
proportion of small satellites being launched annually is
increasing (this becomes especially apparent when
plotted in a normalised fashion in Figure 3). Thirdly,
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Figure 2 There is a downward trend in the numbers of satellite being launched annually
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Figure 3. The ratio of small satellites being launched is increasing
the number of nanosatellites is increasing annually.
Although the statistical data shows the trend of an
increasing annual share of small satellites, it is
necessary to assess the constituent data points in greater
detail. This would allow us to understand the demand
for these satellites launches, which initiates the
development and putting into a full-scale operation
those small launch vehicles which would provide these
launches with an acceptable launch price. The Figures
1-2 show that, on average, ten mini-satellites and ten
micro-satellites find their way to orbit every year while
the average annual numbers on nano-satellites, has also
just approached his number. As was shown in [1], the
total annual number of the small satellites with masses
less than 500 kg would scarcely exceed 30-35 pieces
per year while a share of micro- and nano-satellites in
this figure would be the dominant one.
Indeed, there is an indication that even the entry-level
prices for small launchers are still too high to satisfy the
developers of small satellites with dedicated launcher
needs. In Russia some of the dedicated launch
opportunities are based on converted missiles, and have
been available for the past decade for entry-level costs
of US$6-8 million. This did not have a significant
effect on the market, and it is therefore difficult to
assess whether the small satellite market would grow
significantly should new a launcher address this market
Webb
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sector. The establishment of Falcon-1 in the market will
be an interesting case to watch because of the particular
challenges faced by US launch customers. In the US,
government customers are restricted to select from only
US launch vehicles. Commercial organisations do not
have such restrictions as they can largely select based
on value, but are faced by a complex and expensive
export controls. Some have been able to benefit from
the lower prices outside the US [7], but few have the
necessary in-house capability to do this successfully
without expert support.
These indices, both for current time and for the near
future, are evidently insufficient justification for the
development of a dedicated small launch vehicles that
would have a payload capability at the level of 100-300
kg and would provide a launch price less than US$ 3-5
million. So, it is reasonable to rely upon those launch
vehicles that either are in operation at the current time,
or are being currently developed with high chances for
realization.
Summary of launch methods
Several methods are currently being used to launch
small satellites. These methods include:
• Dedicated launch, in which a single small
satellite is a prime (sole) payload,
• Rideshare (or shared) launch in which the
launcher’s payload consists of two or more
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•

•

•

satellite launches take place. It shows that the majority
of small satellite launch opportunities are in Russia,
with the remainder in the USA.

identical satellites (the “batch” option) or
satellites that have approximately equal
masses and dimensions,
Cluster launch in which the launcher’s
payload is a cluster of more than three
different small satellites
piggy-back launch in which one or several
small satellites are the secondary payload
(“piggy-back”) in a regard to the primary
payload that is one of more spacecraft of
significantly more mass
Sub-satellite, in which the secondary small
satellites is separated from a host spacecraft
after it has been deployed into space. In the
past the space stations have been used for this,
but recently it has been used to deploy
cubesats and smaller spacecraft.

The launchers used by small satellites are based on
launch vehicles from across the world, and are listed in
Table 1 alongside the parameters that are of importance
for their selection for small satellite missions (payload
capability, launch price and specific launch price).
The launchers listed include those small launch vehicles
which are being used for both the dedicated and
rideshare launches of small satellites, and
medium/heavy classes’ launchers that are providing
currently piggy-back launches in a process of their
certain primary missions. It can also be observed that
medium launchers were used regularly for batch
launches, and that have all but disappeared since 2003.
Further analysis reveals that these were the clusters of
communication satellites. It is also noted that shared
launch is becoming an increasingly popular method of
launch for small satellites.

The annual distribution of these methods for the 1990
to 2008 period is shown in Figure 4. As can be
observed, the share of piggy-back launches is currently
more than 50%. The second most popular method is the
rideshare method while a use of the dedicated launch
method has had an average share of less than 20% and
has remained relatively stable during the period
investigated.

Beside the operational launch vehicles listed in Table 1,
there are a certain number of small launch vehicles that
have either rarely been used for launches of small
satellites (as a rule, in dedicated launches), or are in the
process of being brought into operation in the near
future. These are also listed alongside their key

Figure 5 also illustrates the countries where these small
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Figure 4. Uses of various launch methods for small satellites
Webb

5

23rd Annual AIAA/USU
Conference on Small Satellites

100%

80%

60%

Brazil
40%

Israel
Japan
China

20%

India
Europe
USA
Russia

19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08

0%

Figure 5. small satellite launch numbers by launch nation
parameters in Table 2.
Undoubtedly, dedicated launches are preferable for the
majority of missions, with the possible exception of
those missions being performed with multiple satellites.
However, the provision of dedicated launch
arrangement with a minimum launch price would
require that the launcher’s payload capability has to be
fully utilised. i.e. a launch mass of the satellite to be
launched has to be approximately equal to the
launcher’s payload capability. The world’s launcher
inventory does not currently have many operational
small launch vehicles that have their payload
capabilities at or below the level of micro-satellites’
mass. The only exclusion is the Russian “Shtil-1”,
however, this small launcher is converted from a
submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), and its
use has significant limitations for commercial
operations, stipulated by both organizational and
political reasons. It is however suitable for small
satellites developed by organisations with government
funding, which still covers a large fraction of the small
satellites launched. The only exception where a
dedicated launch can be cost-effective is where the
launch risk is still high, for instance with the first few
test and operational launches of a launch vehicle being
brought into full operation.
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With the increasing interest in responsive space in
several countries now, it is possible that governments
will support several developments of low cost and
responsive, dedicated launchers for small satellites.
These missions are generally required to fulfil missions
for defence or national security, and must be launched
within a very short period of time. A realization of this
concept requires not only the use the dedicated launch
method (excluding the cases when a cluster of the same
type’s satellite should be launched in a frame of the
“responsive access” concept) but also the corresponding
launch vehicle that would provide this launch on
request (see [2]). If the requirement to provide
“responsive access [to space]” increases, it will become
feasible for more small satellites to be launched via a
dedicated launcher, even in the micro-satellite subclass.
Non-dedicated launch methods provide lower prices for
the launch of small satellites, especially for micro- and
nano-sub-classes. Although a comparison of specific
launch prices presented in Tables 1-2 shows that certain
ones achieve levels of less than US$10,000/kg both for
small and medium/heavy launch vehicles, it should not
be forgotten that these specific launch prices are
calculated based on using the complete payload
capabilities. Since the current small launch vehicles
have payload capabilities that exceed a maximum mass
of single micro-satellite by 5-10 times in the best case,
23rd Annual AIAA/USU
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it is evident that the presented specific launch prices
can be achieved for micro-satellites only if these
satellites are launched by these launchers in rideshare
missions, and with a single customer interface to the
launch agency. This, in turn, creates the problem to
gather together a necessary number of small satellites
with a total launch mass near to a payload capability of
the chosen small launch vehicle and to arrange and
provide these satellites’ mutual readiness by the
scheduled term of launch.
In some cases, manufacturers of small satellites pool
together to buy a launcher and perform a rideshare
launch. Such a shared launch provides some control,
and the concept is similar to a bus: No one gets exactly
where they want to go, but it is cheaper than hiring a
taxi for your exclusive use. SSTL has recently
manufactured sufficient small spacecraft that it can
afford to buy an entire launcher at times, and sell the
excess capacity – this is the example how the similar
pool for a launch of several small satellites by a single
small launcher would be arranged.

for small satellites launches by the rideshare method
since these parameters are being defined by
requirements of the primary mission while the same
parameters for a rideshare launch would be agreed
between partners-customers of this type’s launches.
Nevertheless, the piggy-back launch method is
providing lowest launch prices for small satellites. In a
majority of the cases, heavy launch vehicles are having
certain reserves of payload capability in their missions
and these reserves are comparable with masses of single
or two-three micro-satellites. In order to gain an
additional profit, the launch vehicle operators are
welcoming this sort’s missions. Besides this profit,
launching more spacecraft per launcher also is good PR
as one can quote more “spacecraft launched”. An
example of piggy-back small satellites accommodation
on the primary payload is shown in Figure 7.

The example of small satellite rideshare launch
preparation is shown in Figure 6.

Figure 7. Accommodation of the FASAT and Techsat
small satellites for a launch as piggy-backs
Figure 6. Accommodation of small satellites for a
rideshare launch on the “Cosmos-3M” small launch
vehicle
The piggy-back launch method is providing fewer
difficulties in this regard since the primary payload has
been already defined for every potential launch i.e. for
that launch in which the reserve of the launcher’s
payload capability would allow to accommodate some
piggy-back payload (payloads). This method gives still
less control over the piggy-back payload in terms of the
final orbit, or the date/time at which they launch than
Webb
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mission’s main requirements. If there are not the strict
requirements on exact parameters of final orbit, term of
launch and, moreover, a necessity to provide the
responsible access for the satellite to be launched, the
piggy-back method would be most preferable from the
point of view of launch cost reduction.

Figure 8. Piggy-backs of the SPOT missions on the
“Ariane-4” launcher’s ASAP platform
Some launch operators provide a standardised platform
for accommodation of small spacecraft to be launched
as piggy-backs (the example of this platform, the
Arianespace’s ASAP is shown in Figure 7).
Some governmental agencies have done the same in
order to stimulate opportunities in their market (e.g. US
Air Force with the EELV ESPA ring, and JAXA with
their launcher). Certain operators such as Arianespace
have made a conscious business decision in the belief
that manufacturers of small satellites would become
large satellite customers later.
It is necessary to note that the participation in any
mission on a launch of multiple satellites, both a
rideshare launch and a launch with piggy-backs, inflicts
certain obligations on those small satellite
manufacturers that are using these launches for
launches of their satellites. Thus, the calculations of
launcher’s dynamics takes into account the whole
payload including all its components, therefore, an
absence of any of these components, either a rideshare
small satellite, or a small satellite-piggy-back, at the
moment of launch is inadmissible. SSTL has been
forced to supply a dummy mass payload for certain
such launches to ensure the launch would not be
delayed in case the smaller spacecraft will be not yet
ready by the scheduled term of the launch.
So, the approach to solving the problem of concrete
small satellite launch has to be begun from a choice of
the launch method proceeding from the satellite

Webb

8

Each payload also imposes requirements on the launch
agency, in terms of additional analysis, safety, facilities
etc. Launch prices typically comprise fixed
administration costs, and costs of launch themselves
that are defined by the launcher’s specific launch price
(per kilogram of mass to be launched). For smaller
spacecraft, the administration costs are often most
significant. For piggy-back launches, the specific
launch costs for 100-kg spacecraft (micro-satellites) are
typically at the level of US$10-20 K/kg with taking into
account the administration costs. The resulting launch
prices can be considered sufficiently admissible (US$
1-2 mln. for a launch of 100-kg small satellite and US$
100-200 K for a launch of 10-kg nano-satellite). Not the
launch cost, but finding a suitable launch is probably
the biggest problem, as there is little benefit for the
primary buyer of the launcher to sell excess capacity (it
just introduces risk and complexity). An overwhelming
majority of heavy launchers launch into undesirable
orbits as far as small satellite applications are concerned
(GTO, to get into Geostationary orbit is little use for
anything else than GEO communication satellites).
Therefore, if the difficulty to find a suitable launch by
the piggy-back method on medium/heavy launchers for
some concrete small satellite is found to be
insurmountable, it would be possible to apply to small
launch vehicles.
As this is mentioned above, these launchers are being
most often used for launches of micro-satellites by the
rideshare launch method while nano-satellites can be
launched also as piggy-backs with small satellites of
larger small satellites. In both these cases, it would be
possible to meet the specific requirements for a
concrete small satellite mission to a greater degree since
almost all the small launchers are limited to inject their
payloads into low-Earth orbits (LEOs) and, therefore,
there are more opportunities to match one of the
primary missions announced for the required range of
orbit’s parameters (for piggy-back launches of nanosatellites) or to agree these parameters in an acceptable
range with other partners by a rideshare launch.
At the same time, the specific launch prices can only
slightly higher than for piggy-back launches by
medium/heavy launchers, however, this statement is not
relevant to all the launchers of small class. These
specific launch prices are different for various
countries’ small launch vehicles. It is understood that
23rd Annual AIAA/USU
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this factor is influencing significantly on these
countries’ shares in the world’s market of small satellite
launches.
The distribution of these shares is shown in Figure 5.
On the face of it, there is a contradiction – while Russia
with its cheap (see Table 1) small launchers
predominates in this market, the United States with
their more expensive launchers (see the same Table) are
in the second place nevertheless. However, the simple
explanations are both for this circumstance and for
lower launch prices of Russian small launch vehicles.
Firstly, while a majority of small satellites that have
been launched by the Russian small launchers belong to
foreign customers, the U.S. launch vehicles were and
are launching mostly small satellites of U.S.-based
companies and organisations (these companies and
organisations have difficulty in accessing launch
agencies outside the US due to strict export controls in
“knowledge”, and as such incur difficulties in accessing
launchers outside their nation). Secondly, actually all
the Russian small launchers are being converted from
ballistic missiles that are removed from military
operation and, therefore, their operators have the
opportunity to keep lower launch prices purchasing
main ready hardware by low prices as well. Customers
of small satellite launches outside the U.S.A. have not
the U.S. restrictions, and they (and SSTL in their
number) have broadly used Russian converted small
launch vehicles to launch their spacecraft [3]. Any
potential customer of small satellite launch would use
this opportunity as well.
However, as it is preferred in [4], this opportunity
would be in presence not longer than around 10 years
due to a complete consumption of basing missiles
stocks while the new non-converted Russian small
launch vehicles would have higher launch prices (see
Table 2). These prices should be comparable with
launch prices of new European (“Vega”) and U.S
(“Falcon-1”) small launch vehicles. With this renewal
of the world’s small launcher inventory, the SpaceX
company in the U.S.A. with the promised launch price
~US$ 8.5 mln. for their “Falcon-1E” launch vehicle is
by many seen as the most likely to succeed.
Increasingly, manufacturers of small satellites are
already considering Indian and Chinese launchers [5].
Therefore, the future potential customers will have a
broader range of available launchers for their choice.
There are also some launcher manufacturers who have
started to develop launchers specifically for dedicated
launches of small satellites, especially in a frame of the
“responsive access” concept realization (these launcher
manufacturers see this as a niche in the market). Many
of them have failed with their preliminary projects,
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however, in the future, certain similar projects would be
realized if the market would show the corresponding
demand. This would expand still more a range of
available launchers, especially if the mission of the
small satellite to be launched will foresee the
requirement of ‘responsive access” provision.
Analysis
So, the above approach to the problem of concrete
small satellite launch has to be continued by a choice of
the launcher class if the earlier chosen launch method is
the rideshare or piggy-back launch.
After the choice of the launcher type, the last stage of
the launch problem solving is either a choice of
concrete rideshare mission among the announced
missions of this sort (or an arrangement of this mission
by a selection and invitation of partners for this launch
mission), or a final choice of the concrete launcher in
the case if the earlier done choice was in a favour of the
dedicated launch method. These general statements can
be analysed in more details.
Various factors influence on the choice of launch
method for any concrete small satellite launch. The
main ones of them are the necessity to provide the
satellite launch at the defined term (with certain
tolerances), the necessity to provide the satellite orbit
with required parameters (in a certain range) and the
necessity to provide the satellite launch by a minimum
launch price.
The first of these factors can be designed as Ft . Its
value is equal to zero if the launch should be provided
at any time by request (“responsive access”) and it is
equal to 1 if the time of launch is with indifference (for
example, during a period of three years).
The second factor, Fo can be equal to zero if especially
defined parameters of orbit are not needed for the
satellite mission (this is typical for certain scientific
missions) but it is equal to 1 if the orbit with clearly
defined parameters (with minimum tolerances) is
necessary for the mission.
The third factor, Fc can be assumed to be equal to zero
if the cost of launch is with indifference (for example,
due to importance of the satellite mission). It is equal to
1 if it is required to provide the launch by a lowest cost
while, in the opposite case, the mission would be not
realized.
All the factors can be used for a calculation of the K1
criterion:
K1 = Ft Fo•Fc
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As one can see, this criterion is equal to zero if either
the small satellite should be launched at the clearly
defined time, or this satellite should be inserted into the
orbit with clearly defined parameters, or the launch cost
is with indifference. It is understood that these
requirements can be met by the method of dedicated
launch only. Therefore, this value of the K1 criterion is
equal to zero or near to it, the dedicated launch method
should be chosen. If the criterion’s value is equal to
zero or near to it, the piggy-back launch method should
be chosen without doubts since this method, especially
when primary missions are being provided by heavy
launch vehicles, would provide lowest launch prices but
without meeting requirements for defined launch time
and some restricted requirements for orbit parameters.
Intermediate values of the K1 criterion require
additional explanation. Thus, if the time of launch has
certain limitations but the range of these limitations is a
sufficiently broad one (for instance, the launch should
be carried out during some defined year) or certain
requirements for the satellite orbit are in existence
nevertheless (for example, if this orbit has to have a
high inclination), the value of the corresponding
influencing factor, either Ft or Fo would be equal to 0.5
and the K1 criterion will be around 0.5 as well. This
level of the criterion’s value shows that both the
rideshare and piggy-back launch methods would be
used.
On a basis of the statistic data preliminary analysis, it is
possible to assume that the values of the K1 criterion in
the range of 0-0.2 corresponds to a necessity to use the
dedicated launch method, the range of 0.2-0.5 shows a
preference of rideshare launch method, the 0.5-0.8
gives approximately equal chances for both the
rideshare and piggy-back launch methods use and,
lastly, when this range is exceeded, the piggy-back
launch method has evident advantages.
The choice of launch vehicle class is based on more
empiric considerations. It is evident that the small
class’s launch vehicles are suitable for dedicated
launches of small satellites while heavy class’s
launchers are preferable for those piggy-back launches
for which the K1 criterion is near to 1 (due to lowest
specific launch prices that are being provided by this
class’s launchers). Equally, the small class’s launchers
can provide in the best manner rideshare launches of
small satellites since clusters of these satellites (that are
mostly micro-satellites) have total masses that do not
exceed small launchers’ payload capabilities. However,
when the choice between a rideshare launch by a small
class’s launcher and a launch as a piggy-back by a
medium/heavy launcher has to be done for the small
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satellite mission with the K1 criterion’s value in the
rang of 0.5-0.8, it is necessary to take into account an
influence of additional factors.
The first of these factors reflects the necessity to
provide a defined sort of orbit that cannot be actually
serviced in primary launches of heavy class’s launchers.
Indeed, as this is marked above, these launch vehicles
almost cannot inject the piggy-backs into polar orbits
and sun-synchronous orbits (SSOs) since an
overwhelming majority of their primary missions are
requiring other orbits with low inclinations. So, the
corresponding influencing factor Fso for an especially
required sort of orbit will have the value either of zero,
if this special sort’s orbit is required, or of 1, if this
orbit is not required.
The second factor has to take into account the sub-class
of the small satellite itself. Indeed, it is reasonable to
launch nano-satellites as piggy-backs on any class’s
launchers since it would be difficult to collect a set of
other small satellites around a single nano-satellite for a
rideshare launch. So, the corresponding influencing
factor Fsc has the value of 1 for the nano-sub-class’s
satellites, the value in the range of 0.8-0.3 for microsatellites that have masses from somewhat more than 10
kg to 100 kg accordingly and 0.3-0 for small satellites
with masses from somewhat more than 100 kg to
around 300 kg accordingly I(launches of small satellites
that have masses more than 300 kg would be provided
preferably by the dedicated method).
The K2 criterion for the choice between a rideshare
launch by a small class’s launcher and a launch as a
piggy-back by a heavy launcher can be calculated by
the following formula:
K2= Fso Fsc
One can see that the criterion is equal to zero when only
the small class’s launcher shall be used for a launch of
the assessed small satellite by the rideshare method and
it is equal to 1 for a launch of nano-satellite as a piggyback by a heavy launch vehicle.
The intermediate values of the K2 criterion between 0
and 1 can be estimated by their approximation to the
marginal values: the value equal to 0.5 means that both
the launch methods have approximately equal chances,
the values lower show to a preference for the rideshare
launch method while the values higher give this
preference to the piggy-back launch method.
The K2 criterion does not take into account the case
when nano- and micro-satellites would be launched as
piggy-backs by the medium class’s launch vehicles in
their low-orbital primary missions. These missions
23rd Annual AIAA/USU
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would provide sometimes injections of their payloads,
both primary and secondary ones, into SSOs and polar
orbits, therefore, the Fso factor has not a sense for them.
However, these missions are sufficiently rare ones and,
if the opportunity to use one of them for a piggy-back
launch of some small satellite will take place with
meeting the main particular requirements for the small
satellite mission, this opportunity should be used since,
as for piggy-back launches by heavy class’s launchers,
the piggy-back launches by medium class’s launch
vehicles are also providing lowest specific launch
prices.
The choice of concrete launch vehicle does not require
a use of any criterion. There are a few of simple
principles only: for dedicated launches, the small
launch vehicle would be chosen by its payload
capability that should be near to the mass of the small
satellite to be launched (if the requirement of the
“responsible access” is in existence for the mission, the
chosen launcher should provide this capability, of
course); the small launcher for a rideshare launch
should be chosen proceeding from the total mass of the
satellites that will be gathered for this launch; the
primary mission for a piggy-back launch is being
chosen from the number of this sort’s available
missions by the principle of its maximum
approximation to the desirable parameters of the small
satellite mission (term of launch, orbit, etc.). Of course,
the pricing indices for various small launchers that are
approximately identically suitable for the small satellite
launch should be taken into account as well as
availability of these launchers (the “availability” means
a capability to use the launcher for launches of foreign
payloads, it is stipulated mostly by political
considerations, see [1] for more details).
With this approach to a choice of launch method,
launcher’s class and concrete launcher for any small
satellite and its mission, it is possible to lead to
minimum the difficulties that should be overcome
during solving the problem of small satellite launch,
especially, for those small satellite manufacturers that
have not a significant state support for their activity. Of
course, the proposed method of launch arrangement
optimisation is not a guarantee of the launch problem
solving in all the cases but it shows that a provision of
access to the space for small satellite manufacturers is
not an insurmountable hurdle in a majority of the cases.
The already gained multi-year experience of numerous
small satellite builders confirms this assertion [6].
CONCLUSIONS
1. The increasing share of small satellites being
developed and launched creates a challenge to find
affordable launches matching their operational
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requirements. This has the potential to limit some
commercial and civil missions from being
implemented, despite the satellite technology being
affordable and mature.
2.

Basing on results of statistic analysis, the approach
to a choice of the launch method, launch vehicle’s
class and concrete launcher for a small satellite
mission is proposed and recommendations on this
approach realization are given.

3.

By considering the numbers of small satellites
launched annually, it is clear that the problem of
launch is not insurmountable, and is solved in the
majority of cases.

4.

It is shown that the problem of small satellite
launch is not an insurmountable hurdle and that
this problem would be solved in a majority of the
cases.

5.

It is recommended that the small satellite
community continue to persuade the organisations
procuring dedicated launches in accepting
secondary passengers to make most effective use of
the launcher capacity. The smallsat community will
need to demonstrate a certain degree of benefit to
the primes, and individual organisations may need
to work with a broker or aggregator to help secure
specific slots.

6.

It is recommended that those seeking a shared
launch consider working with organisations with
suitable experience. Launch providers prefer to
have only a single contractual interface, and there
are many political, export and logistical hurdles to
overcome,
especially
when
considering
international launch options.
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